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Abstract: The election in Iran 2009 caused a serious crisis in Iranian society. The news media 
around the world reported about alleged manipulation, election fraud and other irregularities. 
“Where is my vote?” became the rallying cry of Iran’s opposition. This paper presents a cross-
national comparative media analysis of news reporting on the Iranian election and the subsequent 
national and international reactions. It focuses on how a controversial political event was covered 
by two of the world´s leading television news broadcasters: Al Jazeera Arabic and CNN 
International, with a particular focus on Al Jazeera. Two theoretical frameworks were adopted: a 
contra-flow approach – Al Jazeera as an alternative source of news – as well as its role with respect 
to democratization. Two flagship news programs were analyzed over a six-week period in summer 
2009. With quantitative framing analysis as the central methodology (using statistical factor 
analysis), we focused on the content of 66 television news stories. 
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The Iranian election 2009 and its aftermath 
 
In Iranian politics, reformist movements such as those sparked by Rafsanjani and 
Khatami have often faced resistance (Topa, 2009). In 2005, Iran entered a new 
phase with President Ahmadinejad, who has fostered conservative political 
developments and hindered democratic efforts (Topa, 2009). In the most recent 
presidential election, on June 12, 2009, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won a second 
four-year term with a landslide victory of 63% of all votes cast (Al Jazeera English, 
2009, June 13; Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010, p. 28).  
 
Not only his political opponents Mousavi and Karoubi but also large parts of the 
Iranian public were sceptical about the legitimacy of the election; reports of 
unavailable ballots and closed polling stations were filed and the news media 
reported globally on rallies in the streets, demonstrations, and calls for a new 
election. “Where is my vote?” became the rallying cry of the opposition in Iran. Al 
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Jazeera English characterized the situation as “the biggest unrest since the 1979 
revolution” (Al Jazeera English, 2009, June 14).  
 
Parts of the Iranian establishment and the Iranian revolutionary guard initiated 
military-backed counter-movements to repress the demonstrations and enforce 
media censorship. The killing of Neda Agha Soltan, a protesting Iranian woman, 
on June 20, 2009, became a mediatized symbol for the struggle of the Iranian 
people.  
In the course of the events a number of positions merged together. People 
gathering in the streets to protest the outcome of the election were joined by 
citizens opposing the system as a whole and expressing a general political 
dissatisfaction with life in Iran (Perthes, 2009a). The protest became known as the 
Green Movement — green being the color of Mousavi’s election campaign, but in 
the post-election period, “green became the color for all opposition and reformist 
groups” (Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010, p. 28).  
 
Because of the highly controversial nature of the Iranian election, we were 
interested in how the events and controversy were covered in the news. A number 
of sensitive issues, e.g., Iran’s controversial nuclear program and its geopolitical 
location in the Middle East between Iraq and Afghanistan ensured the elections a 
high global news value. Therefore, we chose to examine television newscasts 
covering the election and its aftermath of two international news channels – Al 
Jazeera Arabic and CNN International.  
The comparison of a Western and an Arabic news channel seemed especially 
appropriate, since both broadcasters play an important if at times controversial 
role in the international media landscape; both have likewise drawn worldwide 
attention through their live reporting of crises in geopolitical hotspots, and both 
are likewise widely viewed and regarded as highly trustworthy among their 
respective audiences (Powers & Gilboa, 2009, p. 56, Pew Research, 2011). 
Additionally, each is essential to an in-depth discussion about potential effects and 
influence of the news media. In the 1990s, it was CNN’s news coverage that was 
commonly said to be able to influence policy-making (the “CNN Effect”, Gilboa, 
2005): twenty-four-hour live reports and comprehensive news coverage of crises 
such as the 1991 Gulf War, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo created public pressure on 
government policy makers to address the crises and to react (Nisbet et al., 2004, p. 
16). After 9/11 it was Al Jazeera that was held to be in part responsible for the 
global anti-American mood: after airing several speeches of Osama bin Laden and 
his sympathizers, the channel was said to have influenced Muslim public opinion 
and raised the level of negative sentiment against the U.S. (the “Al Jazeera Effect”, 
Nisbet et al., 2004, p. 12). The perceived power to determine foreign policy that 
has been attributed to each is one explanation for the relevance of examining their 
news coverage – in particular, the Iranian election 2009. 
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Theoretical background: Same agenda, different views  
 
CNN International and Al Jazeera Arabic are twenty-four-hour news channels 
reporting from all over the world for a global audience; both present news 
programming on a continuous, real-time basis. CNN International, launched 
originally in 1985 as a spin-off from Ted Turner’s CNN and initially targeting 
American business travelers, is a commercial news organization with its main 
offices in Atlanta, Georgia (USA); international news reporting was increased in 
the 1990s and efforts were made to reposition the broadcaster as an internationally 
oriented news provider (Zimmer, 1996, p. 167). Al Jazeera was initiated in 1996 by 
the Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani with the intention of 
establishing a news organization similar to Western players such as CNN and BBC 
World Service, but with a clear focus on issues directly related to the Arab World 
(Powers & Gilboa, 2009, p. 55). Since that time, the Arab broadcaster has 
continued to challenge the hitherto predominant Western international agenda 
with first-hand news information and images directly out of the Arab world. Al 
Jazeera Arabic, along with its international English service, is today one of the 
most important sources of news for people all over the world (Powers & Gilboa, 
2009; Johnson & Fahmy, 2009, p. 24). 1  
In addition to their respective broad reach and credibility, CNN International and 
Al Jazeera Arabic have both faced accusations of ideological bias with respect to 
news content: Al Jazeera for presumably anti-American and anti-Israeli bias and 
CNN International as pro-American. After the airing of videotaped recordings by 
Bin Laden, Al Jazeera was branded a mouthpiece for al-Qaida (Hafez, 2005a, p. 8; 
Wessler & Adolphsen, 2008, p. 439; Kraidy, 2009). Despite proclamations of 
independence, CNN International has been perceived by some to show a pro-
American bias in its news commentary, an aspect which allegedly crystallized 
during news coverage of 9/11 and the Iraq wars (Hafez, 2005a, 2009; Seib, 2005). 
It will become clear that both news providers are competing economically and 
ideologically for an international news market. Inasmuch as both broadcasters are 
packaging news for international audiences, they often are covering the same 
issues and agenda. However, the difference is that each is framing its presentation 
according to its “own home-grown narrative” (Hafez, 2009, p. 2). That means that 
they do not only provide “’just the facts’ about public affairs” (Gross & Brewer, 
2007, p. 122), they also provide certain ideas for understanding and interpreting 
the issue. Ultimately, differences in media frames may alter viewers’ believes about 
reality (Pan, 2009).  
It has already been documented that Al Jazeera and CNN International frame their 
news coverage differently despite similar agendas, examples including their 
mutual coverage of 9/11, the 2001 Afghanistan war, and Iraq 2003 (Wessler & 
Adolphsen, 2008; Hafez, 2005a; Seib, 2005). Thus we ask: 
                                                 
1 According to a survey conducted by Gallup, 2002, 42.7 percent of the Egyptians, 67.3 percent of 
the Jordanians, 58.6 percent of Kuwaitis, 45.8 percent of Moroccans, and even 64.1 percent of the 
Saudi Arabians ranked Al Jazeera as one of their three most important sources of news (Powers & 
Gilboa, 2009, p. 56). 
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RQ1: How were the Iranian presidential election and its consequences framed by 
Al Jazeera Arabic and CNN International? 
 
A second theoretical framework derived from Al Jazeera’s described role as a 
“contra-flow provider” (Thussu, 2007, 2008; Sakr, 2007; Wessler & Adolphsen, 
2008; Boyd-Barrett, 2009). The international news market was for a long time 
exclusively shaped by a Western interpretational framework. The development of 
non-Western media like the Qatar-based Al Jazeera has broken up the dominance 
of Western media and thus the dominant “Western viewpoint” on events in the 
world. Therefore, in its role as an alternative, non-Western source of news, Al 
Jazeera has consequently been labeled a “contra-flow provider”.  
 
Contra-flow is defined as an information flow originating in non-Western 
countries (Thussu, 2008) and bringing third world countries’ perspectives into the 
broader international arena (Padovani, 2008). Al Jazeera is thereby regarded as a 
prime example, since transnational Arab news networks are an “effective (…) tool 
of information [and serve to inform] the world about Arab views on regional 
conflicts, whether in Palestine, Iraq [or even Iran]” (Hafez, 2005a). Their news 
coverage, particularly that of the “war on terror,” elevated Al Jazeera to the level of 
being an international broadcaster, whose logo appeared on television screens 
around the world. The Arabic news broadcaster thus became a provider of news to 
Western audiences – a reversal of the typical direction of global information flows 
from the West to the developing world or from the northern to the southern 
hemisphere (Thussu, 2007, 2008; Sakr, 2007; Boyd-Barrett, 2009; Kraidy, 2009). 
In 2008, a study by Media Tenor cited Al Jazeera as the most quoted medium in 
international news and branded the Arabic channel “Agenda Setter 2008” (Media 
Tenor, 2008). Wessler and Adolphsen (2008) also collected evidence that Al 
Jazeera functions as a provider of alternative news. Their study dealt with the Iraq 
War 2003 and shows that Arabic news channels can “serve as vehicles for counter 
perspectives” (p. 453) by commenting on current affairs or providing further 
information. In addition, these channels had access to news footage and images 
that other media had not. Arab networks, in particular Al Jazeera, are thus capable 
of counterbalancing the global information flow by challenging the Western 
hegemony of large news agencies like Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France 
Press and international television services such as CNN and BBC (Hafez, 2005a, p. 
12; Thussu, 2007, 2008; Sakr, 2007; Boyd-Barrett, 2009).  
 
The availability of alternative information sources appear to be important for any 
society struggling against an autocratic regime. When national media is restricted, 
the role of foreign media becomes considerable; however, the Western media are 
faced with the reproach that they offer only a one-sided view of political events in 
the Arab world. Offering alternative sources of news and interpretation – a key 
aspect of the contra-flow argument – is a step towards a more democratic media 
landscape and thus a deliberative choice of news and viewpoints for national and 
international audiences (Norris & Inglehart, 2009). In this sense, “contra” is not to 
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be understood here as synonymous with “against” or “in opposition to,” but rather 
“amendatory” or “alternative.” When talking about Al Jazeera as a contra-flow 
provider, we recognize it as a news broadcaster that amends or complements 
Western coverage with its own content (news provider) and alternative 
information (news source). With respect to the issue of information contra-flow, Al 
Jazeera is therefore relevant as an alternative news source as well as being a news 
provider. So, we additionally ask: 
 
RQ2: To what extent does Al Jazeera provide alternative information as 
compared to Western media like CNN International? 
 
To better understand and be able to interpret the answers to these two research 
questions a further theoretical aspect needs to be considered. Having already 
noted that Al Jazeera claims to represent the Arab and Muslim perspective to a 
global public, it is also important to note the internal role that the network plays 
within the Arabic and Muslim public sphere (Powers & Gilboa, 2009, p. 53).  
 
Without meaning to impute to this a simplistic interdependency, we do know that 
the mass media are capable of constructing reality – they raise the issues on our 
agenda and provide the framework for their interpretation (Schulz, 2008). With 
respect to reporting on the Iranian presidential election 2009, this means that the 
calls for reform and protests of the Iranian people are being carried via 
international news providers such as Al Jazeera out to the entire world and thus in 
part into political systems in which democratic structures are weak or even non-
existent. As, for example, Hafez (2005a) indicates, there are many in the Arab 
world that are unhappy with their present form of government, yet have little 
experience with democracy. Media networks such as Al Jazeera thus take on an 
important role “in shaping public opinion on matters related to democratic 
reform” (ibid., p. 6).  
However, the question of whether Arabic media networks are capable of 
encouraging democratic developments, although heavily debated, remains 
unresolved. In the opinion of many observers, Al Jazeera plays a proactive role for 
Arab democracy: “Since most Arab countries have not yet established functioning 
democracies [and] relevant institutions, such as political parties and a 
parliamentarian opposition, are still rudimentary (…) Arab satellite broadcasting 
seems able to mediate between the state and society” (Hafez, 2005a, p. 1). 
Proponents of this role acclaim Al Jazeera for its controversial style of debate and 
its open criticism of Arabic administrations; in their eyes, the presentation of 
opposition discourses is to be celebrated as a breakthrough for the culture of 
political affairs in the Arab world (Powers & Gilboa, 2009, p. 58; Wessler & 
Adolphsen, 2008, p. 439; Miles, 2005, p. 8; Hafez, 2005b, p. 109; El Nawawy & 
Iskandar, 2003). Others view the broadcaster and its mission more critically. They 
fault, for example, the “politainment”-style of Al Jazeera (Hafez, 2005a) and the 
uncritical attitude towards its own initiator and financier – the Qatari Sheik 
(Richter, 2011). Such critics claim that Al Jazeera reports about grievances in Arab 
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countries without mentioning those in Qatar (ibid.). Powers & Gilboa (2009) also 
discuss its alleged uncritical reporting on the genocide in Sudan or the bombing in 
Israel during the second Intifada, “perhaps because Muslims are carrying it out” 
(p. 66). The discourse concerning its role in democratizing the Arab world remains 
ambiguous. 
 
In existing democratic transformation theories (primarily originating in the field of 
political science, Ristock & Frech, 2011), discussions of the role of mass media 
remain subordinate or even non-existent (Thomaß, 2001, p. 39). Reference is 
made in part only to the significance of the “small media,” e.g., the underground 
press in the GDR, which however, were not (and are not) capable of large-scale 
mobilization of the populace (Hafez, 2005a, p. 3). Compared to access to the 
Internet and newspapers, television is widely accessible in the Arabic countries, 
but little theoretical or empirical knowledge is presently available on the role of 
satellite television. Based on an initial analysis of the role Al Jazeera played in the 
protest movements during the Arab Spring, 2011, it would appear that Al Jazeera 
took on an important articulative and communicative function by transmitting to 
other Arab countries news and information – but above all images – of the protests 
and uprisings (Ristock & Frech, 2011, Richter, 2011). “Al Jazeera shared this 
revolution [of the Tunisian uprising] around the region live and in real time, 
breaking the spell that had stopped millions of ordinary people from rising up and 
claiming their legitimate rights” (Miles, 2011).  
To provide an empirical basis for evaluating the role Al Jazeera can occupy in the 
spheres of regional and global communication, a quantitative content analysis of 
the Iranian election reporting was conducted. 
 
 
Method 
 
A framing analysis methodology was deemed most appropriate for a comparative 
analysis of how Iranian election issues were presented in differing media as well as 
differing political and cultural environments. An advantage of frame analysis in 
comparative research is the possibility to reveal latent argumentation structures, 
thus allowing a more detailed analysis of the news material. According to Gamson 
& Modigliani, a frame is “a central organizing idea or story line that provides 
meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (1987, in Pan, 2009). Similarly, and often 
quoted, Robert Entman (1993) pointed out that “framing essentially involves 
selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). Hence, an understand-
ding of the media frame can reveal how issues and personal opinion are shaped by 
the news. 
 
There are three major approaches which can be used to identify relevant frames: 
inductive-qualitative, deductive-quantitative, and inductive-quantitative (Semetko 
& Valkenburg, 2000; Dahinden, 2006, p. 202; Matthes & Kohring, 2008). The 
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inductive-qualitative method “involves analyzing a news story with an open view 
to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 
94). This approach allows for identification of previously unknown frames that 
might be present in the material. Nevertheless, this puts pressure on the 
researcher who must then decide what information structures are to be regarded 
as a frame and what not; this subjective reliance on the decisions of the researcher 
can make replication of the study difficult (Dahinden, 2006, p. 203); the method is 
also labor-intensive and often based on small samples (Semetko & Valkenburg, 
2000, p. 94).  
 
The deductive-quantitative approach “involves predefining frames as content 
analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news” 
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). The choice of frames, which are derived 
from the research literature and/or theoretical considerations, depends upon the 
chosen research question. 
Thus a number of different frame typologies exist for the analysis of political news, 
e.g., episodic, thematic frames (Iyenar, 1991); strategy, responsibility frames 
(Esser & D’Angelo, 2003, p. 635); or conflict frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 
2000). The deductive-quantitative approach is easily replicated and can cope with 
large samples (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). Its major disadvantage is that 
frames not defined a priori cannot be analyzed (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 
95) and new frames cannot be generated (Matthes, 2007). 
 
We chose a mixed method approach, inductive-quantitative, which combines 
elements from the first two: frame elements are initially identified in the material 
(inductive approach); this is followed by deductive quantitative research. In 
accordance with Matthes & Kohring (2008), a frame is understood to be a specific 
pattern in a media outlet that is composed of several elements; these elements are 
previously defined components of possible frames (p. 263), e.g., a certain tenor or 
a specific news topic. Instead of coding the whole frame, we split it into its separate 
elements, which are later coded in a content analysis. The single elements are then 
finally statistically sorted into groups in order to ascertain the underlying 
dimensions. We described these dimensions as a frame.  
As an example: One group of news items about the Iranian presidential election 
predominantly reported on accusations of election fraud by Ahmadinejad 
(variable: main topic, value: election fraud). In the majority of cases, the tone of 
these news items is negative and reproachful (variable: evaluation, value: negative) 
and the political opposition is cited (variable actors, value: opposition). If a certain 
number of news items show this combination of values, a frame can be identified, 
in this case e.g., Opposition frame. 
Conceived this way, frames are neither identified beforehand nor coded with a 
single variable. Instead, the variables as single frame elements are grouped 
together afterwards (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 264; Dahinden, 2006, p. 206). 
Compared to the mere inductive and deductive quantitative methods of frame 
identification, this approach has two main advantages (Matthes, 2007): first, it 
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reduces the probability of individual selection bias using a pure inductive method, 
and second, it increases the empirical validity, since new, previously unknown 
frames can be identified. 
 
Study design  
 
At the beginning of our analysis, a series of items were needed, which later could 
be statistically combined into frames. First, an operationally defined under-
standing of a frame was necessary. We used Entman’s (1993) widely accepted 
definition in which he argues that every frame promotes “a particular problem,” “a 
causal interpretation,” “a moral evaluation,” and/or “a treatment recommend-
dation” (p. 52). If these elements are understood as variables, each of them can be 
operationalized by several categories. In order to identify relevant and important 
frame-elements, we began by conducting an explorative screening of German, 
American and Arabic online journals.2 We also interviewed an expert in the field of 
Iranian politics in order to refine our variables; with this expert’s help and the 
results of our qualitative pre-analysis a basis for valid results was established. 
Table 1 lists the frame elements as defined by Entman (1993) and the 
corresponding variables in our case study. The frame dimension problem 
definition is regarded as the general subject of the newscasts. The pre-analysis 
revealed five important subjects that shaped the news coverage immediately after 
the Iranian election: 1. the discussion about the re-election of Ahmadinejad, 2. the 
national demonstrations, 3. the subsequent military and political repressions of 
the opposition and demonstrators, 4. the subsequent censorship of national and 
international mass media, and 5. the discussions about the disregard for human 
rights.  
We operationalized the frame dimension causal attribution with variables 
measuring the given reasons and responsibilities for the subject, thus measuring 
such variables as election fraud and the public’s desire for political participation. 
Furthermore, we included the most frequent national and international reactions 
as they promote a moral evaluation, resulting in a list of 18 items. Finally, we 
tackled the operationalization of the treatment recommendation as a given 
solution or a recommended development.  
 
Additionally, the category of actor was added, as we were especially interested in 
how the political opponents Ahmadinejad and Mousavi were represented. Thus, 
the actors that were of particular interest were divided into: individuals (e.g., 
Iranian individuals such as Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei and Western individuals such as Barack Obama), groups (e.g., Iranian 
public, international public, public partisans of Ahmadinejad, supporters of 
Mousavi), and institutions (e.g., the Iranian political opposition, the new 
                                                 
2 We used Al-Ahram (daily Egyptian newspaper, http://www.ahram.org.eg/),  Al-Akhbar (daily 
Egyptian newspaper, http://www.akhbarelyom.org.eg/),  ARD.de (German public broadcaster, 
http://www.ard.de/),  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (German daily newspaper, 
http://www.faz.net/s/homepage.html),  New York Times (US daily newspaper, 
http://www.nytimes.com/). 
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government in Iran, the German government, the American government, and 
human rights organizations).  
 
Table 1: Frame Elements as Variables  
 
Frame element Variables 
 
 
 
Problem definition 
as the main subject (S) 
S: Ahmadinejad’s win at election polls 
S: Mousavi’s loss at election polls 
S: national demonstrations / opposition protest 
S: censorship of national & international mass media 
S: military and political repression of opposition and 
demonstrators  
S: disregard of human rights 
 
 
 
Causal attribution 
as reasons and 
responsibilities (R)  
R: mistrust in Ahmadinejad and his policy 
R: election fraud  
R: right of political participation 
R: fight for freedom of opinion / press  
R: desire for political change / reform 
R: mistrust of Mousavi 
R: accusations against Mousavi of working with the West or 
Western media 
R: stemming opposing reactions / assurance of political 
power 
R: Western nations at fault 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moral evaluation 
as the tone of coverage 
and national (N) and inter-
national reactions (IN) 
N: outrage about ‘the stolen votes’ 
N: rejection of Ahmadinejad’s policy  
N: scepticism about legitimacy of election  
N: rejection of Mousavi’s policy 
N: general political dissatisfaction 
N: disappointment about Ahmadinejad’s victory 
N: theory of a political complot 
N: support for Ahmadinejad 
N: support for Mousavi 
IN: rejection of Ahmadinejad’s policy 
IN: scepticism about legitimacy of election 
IN: rejection of Mousavi’s policy 
IN: disappointment about Ahmadinejad’s victory  
IN: fear of strong Iran with respect to its nuclear weapons 
efforts 
IN: fear of expansion of the Shiite principle  
IN: theory of a political complot 
IN: support for Ahmadinejad 
IN: support for Mousavi 
 
 
 
Treatment 
recommendation 
as offered solutions (S) 
 
S: new election 
S: re-count 
S: fair and objective verification 
S: political coup  
S: new dialog between parties 
S: weakening of political/religious establishment 
S: end of military repressions 
S: intervention by human rights groups 
S: intervention by European or American agencies 
S: acceptance of election results 
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To break down the news structures of Al Jazeera Arabic and CNN International, a 
factor analysis was carried out for each of their newscasts. Particular attention was 
paid to the data scale, since the intended factor analysis required metric or a 
dichotomous scale. Therefore, yes/no (1/0) categories were used to measure the 
occurrence of each single item.3 
 
Material  
 
A cross-national comparative content analysis of the flagship television news 
programs on Al Jazeera Arabic and CNN International was conducted. In times of 
war and political campaigns, in particular, prime time newscasts draw the large 
audiences and receive tremendous public attention. Thus, we chose to analyze the 
prime-time 8 p.m. (CET) evening news of Al Jazeera (program title: Al Jazeera 
News) and the 8 a.m. (CET) news of CNN International (CNN Today), both of 
which provide a thirty-minute summary of all of the day’s news in compact form – 
in all, 35 hours of material. 
 
Reliability and Validity  
 
The coding was completed by two researchers. The Arab news broadcasts of Al 
Jazeera were coded by a researcher proficient in both Arabic and English. It was 
deemed important that one of the members of the research team not only be 
proficient in Arabic but also someone who had grown up in the Arabic culture. This 
cultural background not only ensured a better understanding of the news itself but 
also of the cultural context in which the reports were produced. Most international 
studies are conducted by teams representing only one culture or nation; their 
research interests thus are often restricted to their own cultural background and 
socialization (Wirth & Kolb, 2004, p. 89).  
 
Careful attention was also given to the correct translation of the categories to 
ensure a common understanding throughout the coding procedure. An external 
researcher fluent in Arabic, and English as well, was asked to double-check the 
correct translation and wording of the codebook. A pre-test using a subsample of 
five English-language television news stories which varied in their subject matter 
was also carried out. Intercoder reliability was established at .81 (using Holsti’s 
formula); the lowest intercoder reliability value was .70, the highest .92. There 
were high levels of agreement in the formal categories (up to 1.00) and lesser 
agreement in the evaluation categories.  
 
Within the factor analysis we used principle component analysis with a varimax 
rotation as the extraction method to ensure that all the frames (i.e. factors) were 
independent of each other and did not correlate (eigenvalues > 1). It was also 
                                                 
3 Different authors have taken different approaches to the application of dichotomous variables in 
factor analysis (cf. Muthen, 1978; Kubinger, 2003), but it nevertheless has been proposed and also 
utilized as a method for generating frames (cf. Dahinden, 2006, p. 206). 
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determined that a frame should consist of at least three variables, with a 
correlation between single variables of greater than 0.5. The highest values within 
a single frame would establish the most important variable; this variable was 
decisive for the frame name because it was the strongest variable for that factor. 
 
 
Results 
 
A total of 66 news segments referring only to the Iranian presidential election and 
its consequences were analyzed: 37 produced and aired by CNN International 
(CNNI) and 29 by Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA), for a total of 112 minutes of news 
coverage (60 minutes by AJA and 52 by CNNI). Although the Arabic channel 
devoted somewhat more coverage to the election, the difference was not 
statistically significant (t-test: p > .05).4 
 
Quantitative analysis of the individual frame elements  
 
To gain an initial impression of how often the variables occur, the frame analysis 
was preceded by a frequency analysis. The aim was to find out which elements 
occurred within the four frame dimensions, thus providing an initial comparison 
of the two news broadcasters.  
 
The analysis of elements in the frame dimension problem definition revealed that 
the main topics for both news programs were the poll win of Ahmadinejad (nAJA = 
18 [62%], nCNNI = 27 [73%]) and the succeeding opposition protests against the 
election (nAJA = 15 [52%], nCNNI = 24 [65%]), thus no difference between 
broadcasters was found. Regarding the dimension treatment recommendation and 
proposed solutions AJA and CNNI were also in agreement: the situation in Iran 
should be brought under control by the Iranian parties by entering into a new 
dialogue (nAJA = 14 [38%], nCNNI = 8 [28%]) and there should be a termination of 
military repressions (nAJA = 11 [30%], nCNNI = 16 [55%]). In both news broadcasts 
the conflict was viewed as an internal affair of state. Interestingly, a possible 
American or European intrusion was mentioned by neither as a plausible option, 
which gives rise to speculation: e.g., the German news magazine “Der Spiegel” 
reported (June 14, 2009) that Ahmadinejad’s victory had apparently caught a 
number of Western countries by surprise; they had not anticipated a majority for 
Ahmadinejad, and thus initial reactions to the election outcome came late 
(Schmitz, 2009). Another interpretation that circulated was that the reluctance 
shown by Obama (and the EU) was an expression of an American policy change for 
the region, one that was to be influenced more by rapprochement rather than 
conflict (Wernicke, 2009; FoxNews.com, 2009). Certainly Iran’s geopolitically 
                                                 
4 The authors decided to test the variables for significance. The reason is that significance tests not 
only indicate whether the results are truly representative, but also indicate whether they were 
found systematically. Thus a statistically significant result has a stronger informative value 
(Westermann, 2000, p. 337). 
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sensitive position must be considered; in this respect security issues (keyword 
nuclear conflict) as well as economic questions must have played a role. Iran was 
still, after all, the country with the second largest oil and gas reserves worldwide 
and thus an important economic power in the region as well as for Europe and the 
USA; thus a cautious response was called for (Perthes, 2009b).  
 
The first significant differences between the two broadcasters were found in the 
frame dimensions causal attribution and moral evaluation. The American 
broadcaster tended more strongly to view the aftermath of the Iranian election in a 
global context. Typical news captions included “global day of action against the 
repression in Iran (July 7, 2009), “international memorial for the victims in Iran” 
(July 7, 2009), and “global remembering of Neda Agha Soltan” (July 30, 2009) – 
events that Al Jazeera did not focus on. On Al Jazeera the outcome of the election 
was embedded in a greater general discussion about political participation and 
change. CNNI’s reporting of the election aftermath most strongly emphasized the 
mistrust in Ahmadinejad’s politics (nCNNI = 23 [62%]) and the assumption of 
election fraud (nCNNI = 16 [43%], whereas AJA stressed the assurance of political 
power (nAJA=11 [38%]) and the desire for political change (nAJA=10 [35%]). These 
are thus the first indications that the Arabic broadcaster focuses more on the 
general political dissatisfaction among the Iranian people vs. CNNI’s attention 
given to the election itself and violations of Western perceptions of ‘democratic 
norms’.  
 
Different frames, different messages 
 
In the broadcasts by CNN International we detected five different frames, and in 
those by Al Jazeera Arabic four, which explains 40% (CNNI) and 56% (AJA) of the 
variance in framing for each broadcaster. CNNI and AJA news coverage thus share 
a similar level of differentiation; both select multiple topical foci and present 
varying perspectives within one news segment.  
 
Frames in the coverage of CNN International. Analyzing the news structure of 
CNNI’s election coverage of the Iranian election and its aftermath, we found five 
frames (see table 2): 
 
1. Hope  
2. Support for Mousavi  
3. Support for Ahmadinejad  
4. Criticism of Ahmadinejad for disregarding human rights 
5. Mousavi accused of working with the West 
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Table 2: Matrix of rotated component analysis – CNN International 
 Components 
Frame elements  1  2  3  4 5 
Desire for political change/reform 0.905     
Re-count 0.848     
Fair and objective verification  0.733     
N: rejection of Mousavi’s policy 0.673     
N: disappointment about the 
victory 
0.697     
New election  0.823    
N: general political dissatisfaction  0.808    
N: support for Mousavi  0.523    
N: support for Ahmadinejad   0.860   
Acceptance of election results   0.858   
Stemming opposing reactions   0.827   
Intervention by human rights 
groups 
   0.883  
IN: rejection of Ahmadinejad’s 
policy 
   0.830  
Disregard of human rights    0.647  
End of military repressions    0.575  
Mousavi accused of working with 
the West 
    0.799 
Western nations at fault     0.733 
Mistrust in Mousavi     0.617 
 
Note. Extraction method: principle component analysis with a varimax rotation  
N = 37, r > .5; single frame must consist of at least three variables. 
 
1. Hope. This frame is the most important frame of the news broadcast as it 
explains roughly 10% of the variance and thus was relevant for every 4th report 
(given that a frame can occur only once in a news item). The hope frame deals with 
the disappointment expressed by some members of the Iranian public after the 
announcement of Ahmadinejad’s victory. The frame thus captures the demand for 
fair and objective verification and a possible re-count of the ballots. The frame 
showed that the desire for political change in Iran is the most important item. 
Interestingly, the variable rejection of Mousavi appears to contradict other 
variables in the frame. It was Mousavi, after all, who opposed Ahmadinejad in the 
election and promised to introduce reform and change. This possibly reflects a 
sentiment that Mousavi, too, was not seen as an appropriate leader. 
 
2. Support for Mousavi. The second frame can be seen as one possible 
consequence of the disappointment felt by some Iranian groups. The frame 
consists of the items national support for Mousavi, which strongly correlates with 
general political dissatisfaction (r = 0.4, p < .05) and the demand for a new 
election (r = 0.6, p < .01). The analysis of the actors shows that Mousavi’s 
supporters could not only be identified within the Iranian population but also 
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within the political and religious establishment. On July 7, 2009, CNNI reported 
on the support of unnamed members of the new government and the Islamic 
cleric; the former president Rafsanjani is also presented as a supporter (news on 
July 5, 6, 17, 2009).  
 
3. Support for Ahmadinejad. In addition to their reporting on political 
dissatisfaction, CNNI also reported on political and even religious support for 
Ahmadinejad. The American newscast also focused on the people behind 
Ahmadinejad providing support and legitimacy. This frame gives preference to the 
solution of acceptance of the election results, which was also supported by the 
Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the political partisans of 
Ahmadinejad.  
When comparing the actors in frame 2 and 3, it becomes obvious that the political 
and religious establishment in Iran was presented as divided. In both frames it was 
coded as an “active actor”5 – one group supporting the political opposition such as 
Rafsanjani, and the other preferring the new government with its head 
Ahmadinejad (e.g., Khamenei). This result is interesting, as it shows a split 
political establishment.  
 
4. Criticism of Ahmadinejad for disregard of human rights. The fourth frame 
refers to the military and political repressions to which the opposition was 
exposed. The frame refers to international discussion about implications for 
human rights and the demand for an end to military repressions. The frame 
variables show that disregard of human rights goes along with international 
rejection of Ahmadinejad’s policy (r = 0.4, p < .05).  
This frame is also interesting for other reasons: anecdotal accounts from people in 
Europe or the USA having family or friends in Iran are highlighted. 
Correspondents interviewed a journalist who was arrested in Iran (newscast July 
2, 2009), for example, as well as family members who spoke about the arrest or 
even the death of other family members (July 11 and 26, 2009) in Iran. Here CNNI 
is placing the events in Iran within another, more global context of reference. The 
events in Iran are recounted from the perspective of those living in the West – 
CNNI’s sphere of influence. 
 
5. Mousavi accused of working with the West. The last frame deals with the 
possibility that Mousavi, as Ahmadinejad’s main opponent, would also not be an 
appropriate political leader. CNN reported on mistrust and reasonable doubts 
about the appropriateness of Mousavi. The structural analysis of the protagonists 
reveals that this contention was most notably spread by the new government and 
especially Ahmadinejad. That in itself is not something unusual; election battles 
often bring out bitter rivalries among the candidates (Schulz, 1997, p. 186). The 
interesting aspect here is that our investigation focused on the post-election 
coverage, rather than the usual investigation of coverage before and during an 
                                                 
5 Within a specific news report spokesmen as well as initiators of a discussion were coded as active 
actors. 
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election. Our analysis reveals the ongoing candidate rivalry following the election. 
It indicates the problems with political legitimacy that Ahmadinejad was facing. 
In this frame there are two other interesting variables, namely Western nations at 
fault and Mousavi accused of working with the West. The latter variable refers to 
accusations that Mousavi was cooperating with the Western nations and Western 
media. Here one can construe an anti-Western sentiment arising out of the Iranian 
regime. Western nations at fault refers to the assignment of joint responsibility for 
the situation in Iran to Western nations, thus expressing once more an anti-
Western sentiment of the government. 
 
Frames in the coverage of Al Jazeera Arabic 
 
In the Al Jazeera Arabic news coverage we were able to identify 4 independent 
frames (vs. 5 for CNNI), which together account for 56% of the variance.  
Table 3 depicts the variables which correlate and therefore belong together. The 
frames are: 
 
1. Pro-Mousavi and anti-Ahmadinejad 
2. Hope 
3. International reactions 
4. Mistrust in Mousavi 
 
As it can be seen, Al Jazeera Arabic’s main news topics are quite comparable to 
those of the Western broadcasters, although the frames are more diverse 
internally. A closer look, however, will reveal differences.  
 
1. Pro-Mousavi and anti-Ahmadinejad. This frame has a high significance because 
it explains nearly 1/3 of the reports; the declared variance affects 27%; thus it is the 
most important frame with respect to description of the news coverage. This frame 
reveals a news structure in which support for Mousavi clearly goes along with a 
rejection of Ahmadinejad as the actual elected political leader. It consists of 
variables in which skepticism about the election outcome (e.g., such variables as 
outrage about ‘stolen votes’, possible election fraud) coalesces with general 
dissatisfaction and calls for political reform (desire for change). Where CNNI’s 
coverage included reporting on support for Mousavi as well as for Ahmadinejad, in 
the AJA frames support for Ahmadinejad is inadequately made clear; AJA appears 
to take a more critical position. 
 
2. Hope. In AJA’s coverage, there was also a hope frame identified. Here it deals 
with a marked desire to change policy (r = 0.5, p < .01) and can be linked with a 
more general political dissatisfaction of Iranian groups. Unlike CNNI, the 
variables fight for freedom of opinion and right of political participation play a 
major role here and are directly linked with the wish for political change (r = 0.6, 
p < .05). Al Jazeera thus looks at the outcome of the election in the context of a 
more general discussion of political freedom, with a stronger focus on the mood of 
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the Iranian people. 
 
Table 3: Matrix of rotated component analysis – Al Jazeera Arabic 
 
 Components 
Frame elements 1  2  3  4  
N: support for Mousavi 0.951     
N: theory about a political complot  0.892     
N: rejection of Ahmadinejad’s policy  0.880     
Mousavi’s loss at the election poll 0.875     
Mistrust in Ahmadinejad  0.795     
N: disappointment about the victory  0.661     
Election fraud  0.626     
New election  0.613     
Desire for political change/reform 0.577  0.787   
Fight for freedom of opinion/press  0.832    
N: political dissatisfaction   0.697    
N: outrage about ‘stolen votes’  0.575 0.650    
Right of political participation   0.636    
Disregard for human rights   0.588    
National demonstrations   0.585    
Military repressions   0.580    
N: skepticism about legitimacy of election  0.523   
End of military repressions   0.522    
IN: rejection of Ahmadinejad’s policy   0.874  
Intervention by human rights groups   0.829  
IN: skepticism about legitimacy of election 
campaign 
   
0.689 
 
Acceptance of election poll results   -0.687  
Mistrust in Mousavi    0.893 
IN: support for Mousavi    0.871 
N: rejection of Mousavi’s policy    0.825 
N: support for Ahmadinejad    0.681 
Mousavi accused of working with the West    0.622 
 
Note. Extraction method: principle component analysis with a varimax rotation  
N = 29, r > 0.5; single frame must consist of at least three variables. 
 
3. International reaction. This frame characterizes international reactions and a 
possible discussion about intervention by human rights groups. Al Jazeera 
reported on international skepticism about Ahmadinejad’s election victory and 
international rejection of how he deals with opposition groups. On July 7, 2009, it 
even reported on Iranian groups asking for Western help to sort out the Iranian 
situation.  
 
4. Mistrust in Mousavi. The last frame corresponds with the last frame of the 
American broadcaster. Both frames address the mistrust in Mousavi and his 
possible cooperation with Western nations. This can be seen by taking a closer look 
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at the exemplary newscast of July 20, 2009, on AJA in which Khamenei warned 
the Iranian elite against working together with “anti-Iranian” nations. 
 
Finally, the following commonalities and differences can be seen: 
 
1. For both broadcasters, coverage of the people’s desires for reform and transfer 
of political power play an important role. The hope frame and thus the desire 
for reform is prominent in the news coverage of both broadcasters; however, a 
substantial difference becomes apparent: the American broadcaster’s coverage 
is more focused on election results (variables, e.g., re-count, fair and objective 
verification), whereas with AJA the election outcome becomes the point of 
departure for a fundamental discussion of general political dissatisfaction (e.g., 
right of political participation, fight for freedom of opinion/press). This 
important difference is clearly visible in the broadcasters’ hope frames. Along 
with the desire for political change – the most important value – the second-
most important value in the hope frame of the American news service directly 
relates to the election outcome and calls for a re-count, as compared to the two 
most prominent values in the AJA hope frame: the desire for change and the 
fight for freedom. 
2. Therefore, it can be concluded that AJA focuses more on the mood or 
sentiment of the people in Iran. Thus, AJA keeps the tendency to first look 
closely at Arab and Islamic issues and then to consider international questions 
(see its self-perceived role in, e.g., Powers & Gilboa, 2009, p. 67). The American 
news service makes greater reference to Western viewpoints, including 
comments from people in the USA or Europe having family members in Iran, 
reports about Western journalists imprisoned in Iran, criticism of election 
results, and violations of human rights.  
3. Comparing the results for both broadcasters, the Arabic broadcaster appears to 
be more critical of Ahmadinejad’s government than CNNI. While CNNI gave 
voice to supporters as well as opponents of both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad 
(support for Mousavi, support for Ahmadinejad), AJA offered fewer voices of 
support for Ahmadinejad.  
 
 
Discussion, prospects and limitations 
 
The Iranian election figured prominently in international news as its outcome had 
the potential to impact regional as well as international developments. On one 
side, within Iran, groups had already congregated before the election in June 2009 
to express their willingness for and openness toward political change. On the other 
side, relations between Ahmadinejad and the West were already tense because of 
Iran’s nuclear program and publically expressed skepticism regarding Western 
influences and connections. Thus for the USA, as well as the EU and Arab states, 
the outcome was important for future political and economic relationships. An 
analysis of the prime-time news programs of two of the most important 
Vol.1No.2Autumn 2011  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
18 
 
international news broadcasters (in this context, at the very least) – the Western 
CNN International and the Arabic broadcaster Al Jazeera Arabic – was of special 
interest, particularly because of Al Jazeera’s potential role as a provider of 
alternative information to Western news media (media contra-flow) and the 
controversy regarding its potential impact on democratization and liberalization. 
 
A framing analysis methodology was chosen as the most suitable approach as it 
enabled a more in-depth look into the news coverage – not only the topics posed 
and participant actors but also more subtle structures of the coverage. An 
inductive-quantitative frame approach was selected as the most appropriate 
design, as it allowed for a more open-ended approach than searching for media 
frames that are defined a priori. 
 
In answer to our first research question, we were able to show that Al Jazeera 
Arabic as well as CNN International selected various topical foci and presented 
differing perspectives even within a single newscast. Even when the Arabic news 
channel seemed more critical of the re-elected government, it focused on different 
political opinions and presented different political positions. Therefore, Al Jazeera 
thus fulfilled its own mission as a news broadcaster including criticism of existing 
governments in the Middle East region - in this specific case of the Iranian regime. 
It emphasized political issues that were hitherto (before its launch) excluded from 
public debate in the Arab World (cf. Hafez, 2005a, p. 15). 
Comparing the results of the frame analysis it became clear that both broadcasters 
addressed the irregularities associated with the election outcome. CNN 
International’s focus was on alleged election violations and the question of a fair 
and objective outcome; Al Jazeera, on the other hand, attempted to position the 
election outcome within the context of a more general political discussion about 
dissatisfaction and political change. The hope frame was found in the coverage of 
both broadcasters, but differed in the variables that were emphasized; the 
openness of Iranian groups to new political and social developments was clearly 
more evident on Al Jazeera. 
 
This last result was especially interesting with respect to our second research 
question concerning the contra-flow idea. Al Jazeera is widely viewed as an 
international news service that offers an alternative source of information and 
ideas. It has been argued that the broadcaster is capable of upending the dominant 
Western viewpoint present in coverage of global events. Summarizing our results 
with respect to the contra-flow concept, our analysis revealed a stronger 
engagement on the part of Al Jazeera with the Iranian people, whereas CNNI’s 
framing of the election aftermath took more of a Western view and focused more 
on election fraud, disregard of human rights, and those in the West affected by the 
outcome. This underlines the specific role of Al Jazeera compared to other 
international news channels – covering the same issues but in a different framing.  
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Thus, we conclude that Al Jazeera is regarded as a reliable source of news for many 
people in the Arabic speaking world and is received by more than 50 million 
people, all over the world (Doetzer, 2009). Its audience relies on the broadcasting 
network and many viewers perceive it as their most trusted source of news. Hafez 
(2005a) argues that the “media could be effective in providing information on 
democratic developments elsewhere and in the Arab world” (p. 6) and goes on to 
infer that networks such as Al Jazeera could be “the information hub for a spill-
over effect triggering similar protests throughout Arab countries” (p. 10). Even if 
the media’s reporting is not enough to create such a spill-over effect, the role they 
can assume is an important one. It is our conclusion that the news coverage of the 
Iranian election examined in our analysis demonstrates that Al Jazeera is fulfilling 
its role as an alternative news provider when it comes to discussions of democracy.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis was limited to 66 newscasts, making it 
difficult to statistically support or reject the contra-flow proposition. The actual 
time spent in both news programs on coverage of the Iranian election seemed 
limited – only 12% of the total news coverage (by duration) was devoted to the 
election aftermath. One explanation could be that the media censorship imposed 
by Ahmadinejad aggravated or even disrupted the work of international journalists 
(Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010, p. 28), who are highly dependent on 
alternative news sources. Based on our observations, a further explanation could 
be that much of this information was reported during special broadcasts (e.g., the 
daily Iran desk on CNNI and “Behind the News” or “Under the Microscope” on Al 
Jazeera) and then subsequently omitted from the main newscasts. For future 
research, we suggest a closer look at political and cultural commentaries and 
special reports, in which political opinions are more strongly expressed and 
commented on. Such formats might yield more detailed information with respect 
to the question of contra-flow and democratization.  
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